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ARGUMENT 
A. Section 61-1-1 Must Be Construed in Accordance 
with Rule 10b-5 and not with "Similar" Securities 
Statutes 
The State makes a fundamental error which demonstrates 
the need for this Court to grant certiorari. The State now 
apparently concedes that § 61-1-1 should be read in connection 
with the related federal law but incorrectly implies that § 17(a) 
of the Securities Act of 1933 is the "related federal regulation" 
referred to in § 61-1-27. State's Brief pp. 2, 5-6. In so 
doing, the State chides Mr. Larsen for quoting only a portion of 
the official comment to § 101 of the Uniform Act (State's Brief 
p. 2), then the State omits a critical phrase of the same 
official comment which correctly states: "Section 101 is 
substantially the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule X-
10B-5, 17 Code Fed. Regs. §240.10b-5, which in turn was modeled 
upon § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), 
except that the rule was expanded to cover the purchase as well 
as the sale of any security." Uniform Securities Act § 101, 
official comment ("Official Comment")(emphasis supplied).1 The 
1
 The Draftsmen's Commentary explains that "SEC Rule 
240.10b-5 seems to be the logical model for a uniform state fraud 
provision, both because of the language disparities in the 
existing state statutes and because of the substantial body of 
judicial precedent which has been developed under the federal 
provisions." L. Loss, Commentary on the Uniform Securities Act 7 
(1976). This is another indication that Rule 10b-5, and not § 
17(a), is "the related federal regulation." This is the same 
(continued...) 
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comment recognizes (and the State does not dispute) that Rule 
10b-5 and § 17(a) are construed differently. The Utah 
Legislature specifically intended the Utah act to be construed in 
accordance with "the related federal regulation." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-27 (emphasis supplied). The federal regulation related to 
§ 61-1-1 is Rule 10b-5. Official Comment § 101. Legislative 
intent underlying Rule 10b-5 requires scienter. Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 184, 212-13, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 1390-91, 47 L. 
Ed. 2d 668 (1976).2 
1
 (...continued) 
plain meaning evidenced in the portion of the official comment 
Mr. Larsen originally cited. Petitioner's Brief p. 6. (State's 
Brief p. 4). 
2
 The State avoided directly confronting this point by 
seizing upon one incorrect and one ambiguous citation in the 
Petitioner's brief. State's Brief p. 4 n. 3. Counsel for the 
Petitioner readily acknowledges that they incorrectly, though 
inadvertently, characterized Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 103 S. 
Ct. 3255, 77 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1983) as a criminal action. 
(Petitioner's Brief p. 8-9). The proceedings in Dirks plainly 
were civil. Counsel also acknowledges that its use of dashes 
rather than ellipsis in citing Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n. 12, 
205, 96 S. Ct. at 318 n. 12 1387, resulted in ambiguity (however, 
contrary to the State's representation, the language cited by the 
Petitioner on p. 205 of the Hochfelder opinion refers to 
legislative reports reviewed by the Hochfelder Court in analyzing 
the intent of § 10(b); the Hochfelder Court cited §§ 9(a)(6) and 
(c) only to demonstrate that a variety of business practices had 
been left to regulation by the Commission. 425 U.S. at 205). 
Petitioner's Brief p. 8. 
What the State can do with these mistakes now is a 
separate question. The State cannot (and does not) question that 
Hochfelder held that Rule 10b-5 requires scienter. 425 U.S. at 
212-13, 96 S. Ct. at 1390-91. The State also is careful not to 
suggest that the scienter requirement of § 10(b) — enacted as a 
(continued...) 
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The State cites cases from several jurisdictions, 
arguing that "numerous courts have held that intent to defraud is 
not an element of the crime of securities fraud under statutes 
similar to section 61-1-1(2)." State's Brief p. 6 (emphasis 
supplied). The State neglects to note that of the seven 
jurisdictions it cites, four appear not to have the specific 
legislative directive found in Utah to construe these laws in 
accordance with the related federal regulation.3 Only Michigan, 
Wisconsin and Nebraska have statutory provisions similar to § 61-
1-27. The cited decisions from two of these three jurisdictions 
make no mention of federal law, apparently unaware of federal 
precedent and the legislative intent. The third jurisdiction, 
Wisconsin, ignores the Aaron holding that Rule 10b-5, the model 
2(...continued) 
criminal statute — and a Rule 10b-5 — promulgated pursuant to § 
10(b) — would not apply in criminal proceedings. See 425 U.S. 
at 195-96, 96 S. Ct. at 1382. See also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 
680, 713, 100 S. Ct. 1945, 1964, 64 L. Ed. 2d. 611 (1980) 
(Blackman concurring and dissenting) (noting the pattern of the 
1933 Act and 1934 Act to grant the Commission broad enforcement 
authority without regard to scienter "unless criminal punishments 
are contemplated.") Recognizing this, the unintentional citation 
errors made by Petitioner's counsel, while no less important to 
counsel, do not misstate the principals enunciated by the Supreme 
Court decisions. 
3
 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1800 et sea., Cal. Corp. 
Code § 25000 et sea., 111. Rev. Stat. § 121^-137.1 et sea., N.M. 
Stat. Ann. § 58-13B-1 et sea. Moreover, cases from these 
jurisdictions are deficient in other ways. For example, State v. 
Ross, 104 N.M. 23, 715 P.2d 471, 474 (Ct. App. 1986), relied in 
part on pre-Hochfelder federal cases which, to the extent they 
did not require scienter, were effectively overruled by 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 212-13, 96 S. Ct. at 1390-91. 
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for the provision at issue, requires scienter. 446 U.S. at 690-
91, 100 S. Ct. at 1952-53. In summary, opinions cited by the 
State cannot be reconciled with Utah's legislative mandate. 
B. Mr. Larsen Has Stated a Substantial Basis for 
Granting Certiorari 
The State refuses to grapple with the Court of Appeals 
decision concerning the expert testimony of Sherwood Cook. 
Instead, citing no precedent, the State asserts that Mr. Larsen 
has shown no "substantial basis" for certiorari. The State 
recharacterizes Mr. Larsen's arguments as a challenge just to the 
trial court's ruling and not the Court of Appeals decision. 
Mr. Larsen clearly challenges the Court of Appeals 
decision which found no error in permitting expert testimony by a 
so-called securities expert. Petitioner's Brief p. 14. The 
gravamen of his argument is that the Court of Appeals committed 
reversible error by misapplying Rule 702 and relevant caselaw to 
reach an erroneous conclusion, all in the context of a 
substantial issue regarding the appropriate scope of expert 
testimony/ Of course, because the issue underlying this 
A
 The problem is highlighted by the State's citation (out of 
context) of dicta in a footnote in State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 
322 n.l (Utah 1991), seemingly to suggest that an expert could in 
effect state that he/she knows more about the crime charged than 
the judge or the jury and render an opinion that the defendant 
was guilty of the crime charged. State's Brief p. 9. If this 
were the law, then there is no reason for a judge and jury. Such 
a theory should not be accepted. Of course, a close reading of 
Span and the cases it cites as examples in footnote 1 would not 
(continued...) 
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challenge relates to a trial court ruling, it is impossible, 
contrary to the State's suggestion, to separate the admission of 
the evidence at trial from the Court of Appeals decision; the 
error in the latter arose from its characterization and treatment 
of the former. 
Rule 46 does not limit the kinds of cases for which 
certiorari will be granted to the ^ categories set forth as 
examples: "The following, while neither controlling nor wholly 
measuring the Supreme Court's discretion, indicate the character 
of reasons that will be considered . . . ." Rule 46, Utah R. 
App. P. While this matter arguably implicates issues expressly 
within the scope of Rule 46(c) and (d), this Petition raises a 
matter of "special and important" concern regarding the proper 
scope and use of expert testimony in securities cases plainly of 
the "character of reasons" warranting exercise of the Court's 
power to grant certiorari. Rule 46, Utah R. App. P. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court should grant 
certiorari to resolve these two important issues. 
A(...continued) 
permit an opinion by an expert that goes this far. The cases 
cited in Span permit expert testimony concerning classification 
of a substance under federal controlled substance laws, 
classification of firearms and similar kinds of testimony which, 
although addressed to ultimate issues, would be helpful. These 
characterizations do not include legal conclusions as to guilt or 
innocence, nor do they include the kind of legal conclusion 
embodied in the evidence at issue here. See Span, 819 P.2d at 
322 n.l. 
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